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Abstract
Using a survey of clients from one of the largest Italian banks, we nd that investors with low level
of trust in professional advisors seek nancial counselling, but make their decisions autonomously. We
investigate whether these investors exert some form of control over the recommendations they receive,
and, if so, which one. Investors can push advisors to provide better recommendations either by asking for
a second experts opinion, such as in the case of credence services, or by monitoring closely the advisors
activity themselves. We 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mechanism through which investors exert control over the advisors activity depends instead on the
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nancial literacy. Investors with high nancial literacy directly monitor
the advisorsactivity. Investors with low nancial literacy are more likely to seek a second professional
opinion in support of the recommendations previously received. Our ndings suggest that improving
investor 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comparison between 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to protect poorly literate investors.
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1 Introduction
Investors are being confronted with increasingly complex nancial decisions, partly because shifting economic
policies have forced them to take on more responsibilities and partly because the menu of retail nancial
products has been growing steadily. This poses a serious challenge to investors who want to buy the best
possible nancial product, given their lifetime needs. Several authors (Georgarakos and Inderst, 2011;
Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a,c) argue that the optimal nancial choice depends on investor-specic need
and personal characteristics. For example, the best real estate mortgage, the optimal pension scheme or
long-term saving plan depend, respectively, on the clients expected income stream, desired level of well-
being at retirement, risk attitude or tax bracket. To identify the optimal nancial product, investors can rely
on the advice of experts. Gennaioli et al. (2015) consider professional nancial advice as a credence service
similar to medicine, where "money doctors help investors to get the most appropriate treatment".1 Like
for medical treatments, the accuracy of the expert in solving the client problem is not observable, the nal
success of the service is not contractible, and the experts e¤ort is costly, so that the investoradvisor relation
is a¤ected by moral hazard (Pesendorfer and Wolinsky, 2003; Fong, 2005; Dulleck and Kerchmbamer, 2006).
Investors who rely on professional nancial advice either do so because they trust their advisors (Gennaioli
et al., 2015), or because they are not aware of advisorsmoral hazard (as the naive investors in Inderst and
Ottaviani 2009, 2012c), or because, despite anticipating a conict of interest with the advisor, they think
they are able to control e¤ectively the quality of the recommendations they receive.
This paper studies whether investors exert some form of control over the recommendations they receive
from professional advisors. More precisely, we check whether investors push advisors to give them better
advice either by searching for a second professional opinion (as postulated by Pesendorfer and Wolinsky,
2003) or by monitoring the advisors activity themselves. When the advisor expects the investors-advisees
to seek a second opinion, he has stronger incentives to provide sounder recommendations. Alternatively, as
in any principal-agent relation with a conict of interests, advisors are pushed to exert more e¤ort if the
advisees closely monitor their activity. We also investigate how the investorsdegree of nancial knowledge,
measured both in subjective and in objective terms, a¤ects the control mechanism they enact. Our main
hypothesis is that while highly nancially knowledgeable investors can control the advisors activity by
themselves, through direct monitoring, the least nancially literate ones may search for a second opinion.
1Gennaioli et al. (2015), p. 92.
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Identifying the mechanism of control used by investors to incentivize advisors to provide better recom-
mendations, if any, is important in order to design an e¤ective consumer nancial protection regulation
(Campbell et al., 2011). For example, if more knowledgeable investors verify professional advice on their
own, then clear and transparent disclosure of fees, returns and other characteristics of the recommended
nancial product simplify their tasks. Disclosure and transparency are su¢ cient for highly literate investors,
but not for low literate ones: they need standardization of products to be able to compare di¤erent recom-
mendations.
We test our predictions using the 2007 Unicredit Investors Survey (UCS) conducted on a sample of 1,676
individuals with a current account in one of the banks of the largest Italian banking group.
The survey contains information on the way individuals manage their nancial investments, that is,
whether they invest autonomously ("Self"), ask for advisor counselling but decide independently ("Advice"),
or fully delegate their choice to a professional advisor ("Delegation"). According to Gennaioli et al. (2015),
professionals guide investors with little knowledge in the acquisition of risky assets and investors delegate
their risky investments to the advisor they trust the most. When considering the subsample of investors
holding risky assets, we show that only 20% of investors delegate their investments, while 69% of investors
consult advisors but then make their decisions autonomously. If we consider the subsample of investors
holding risky assets and relying on some form of professional counselling, we nd that 74% of them do
not exert any form of control on advisors activity, which suggests either a widespread investors inertia
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012) or a large presence of naive investors (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012c).
When it comes to explain which investors characteristics a¤ect the control behavior, we nd that self-
assessed nancial literacy and test-based nancial literacy play two important distinct roles.
The degree of self-assessed nancial literacy is strongly related to the probability of exerting some
control activity: Investors who are more condent in their own nancial knowledge are more likely to check
the advisorsactivity. As suggested by Allgood and Walstad (2016), the self-assessed degree of knowledge
reects a persons self-image and is then natural to observe that self-condent investors rely on their own
judgement to control the advisors behavior.
The degree of test-based nancial literacy, instead, impacts the disciplining mechanism put in place.
Investors with the highest level of test-based nancial literacy exert a direct form of control on advisors
activity. Instead, investors with the lowest level of nancial literacy are more likely to compare the rec-
ommendations they receive with second opinions, as postulated by Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) for
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standard credence services. These results are robust if we take into account the potential endogeneity of
both the level of trust in advisors and the degree of nancial literacy.
Our ndings are consistent with some related results in the literature. For example, Bhattacharya et al.
(2012) report that investors with low trust in the advisors and a low level of nancial sophistication are
less likely to demand professional advice, even when this is certied as unbiased. According to the credence
service view adopted in our paper, investors with low trust in advisors probably do not believe they are
being o¤ered unbiased recommendations. Investors with low trust and low nancial literacy may want to
verify the recommendations by asking to a second expert, which may not have been possible in the setting
described by Bhattacharya et al. (2012). That could be a reason why they did not demand advice in the
rst place.
Stolper and Walter (2015) consider the case of neutral nancial advice generated by a computer algo-
rithm, which has been certied to be free from conicts of interest and e¢ cient.2 They report that more
nancially knowledgeable households follow advice to a lesser extent than the less knowledgeable ones. This
behavior could be due to the fact that more literate investors are more likely to check the recommendations
they receive, as in our study. If these investors consider that the recommendations are not su¢ ciently
accurate, they may decide not to follow them.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section
3 reports the empirical analysis and Section 4 concludes the paper. In the Appendix A we describe thor-
oughly all the main variables used in our analysis, while Appendix B collects additional tables with further
robustness checks.
2 Related literature
Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) argue that, in many important nancial decisions, the value realized by
an investor operating a nancial transaction depends on the match between the investors needs and the
characteristics of the selected product, and only a professional advisor is able to identify the correct match.
These characteristics are specic to credence goods, which are goods and services where an expert knows
more about the quality a consumer needs than the consumer himself (Dulleck and Kerchmbamer, 2006,
2The nancial advice studied in Stolper and Walter (2015) consists of a unique "set of product-level recommendations covering
retirement provision as well as the insurance of risks relating to income, property, and health of all household members" (Stolper
and Walter, 2015, p. 5).
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p.5).
The credence goods approach is not new in the industrial organization literature (Wolinski, 1993, 1997;
Fong, 2005).3 In nance, Gennaioli et al. (2015) explicitly refer to nancial advice as a credence service
through which professionals guide investors with little knowledge in the acquisition of risky assets. The
authors argue that investors delegate their risky investments to the advisor they trust the most because it
makes them feel less anxious than if they acted on their own, just as patients follow the treatment prescribed
by a doctor they trust.4 Other works also highlight the positive e¤ect of trust on stock market participation,
as, for example, Guiso et al. (2008) and Georgarakos and Inderst (2011), especially for households with low
nancial capability. A peculiar characteristic of the model of Gennaioli et al. (2015) is that an investor
with high trust in an advisor dismisses the latters agency bias (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a,b), incentives
to sell products with higher fees (von Gaudecker, 2015), and incentives to mis-sell products (Inderst and
Ottaviani, 2009).5
We conjecture that some investors with low condence in their advisor could instead rationally anticipate
the potential conict of interest in the clientexpert relation and exert some form of control to overcome
it. Considering the case of clients aware of the moral hazard inherent in credence services, Pesendorfer and
Wolinsky (2003) study the e¤ects of a mechanism that allows them to discipline the expert, that is, the
search for a second opinion. Alternatively, we conjecture than in nancial markets an investor could verify
the advisors recommendation on his own, by paying monitoring costs.
Our work contributes to the vast literature studying the relationship between nancial knowledge and
the demand for professional advice.
Evidence from the economic literature suggests that nancial literacy and nancial advice may be either
complements or substitutes. Some papers argue that the objective level of nancial literacy of investors
explains their demand for advice.6 Using the 2009 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
Financial Capability Survey, Collins (2012) nds that more knowledgeable investors are more likely to seek
nancial advice than those with lower nancial literacy. This same result is conrmed by van Rooij et al.
3For an exceptionally comprehensive review, see Dulleck and Kerchmbamer (2006).
4Recently, Pauls et al. (2015) nd that the level of trust in professional advisors is not homogenous across nancial interme-
diaries in Germany. They nd that the level of trustworthiness of nancial advisors acting in community banks is larger than
that of advisors of large banks.
5With reference to the mortgage market, Woodward and Hall (2000) emphasize that mortgage loans are leading examples
of transactions where experts on one side of the market take advantage of consumerslack of knowledge and experience. The
authors nd that confused borrowers overpay for brokersservices and that borrowers sacrice at least $1,000 due to shopping
from too few brokers.
6See Kim et al. (2016) for a study on the optimal delegation of investment management in a life cycle setting.
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(2011), Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011), and Calcagno and Monticone (2015) using di¤erent datasets.
Similarly, Hacketal et al. (2012) suggest that nancial advisors are matched with wealthier and higher income
households.
Instead, Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) nd that investors who choose to participate in the stock market
rely on advice only if their own level of nancial education is su¢ ciently low. Also Hung and Yoong (2013)
support the idea that the demand for professional advice could substitute for the level of nancial knowledge.
Other papers emphasize the relation between the subjective, i.e. the self-assessed level of nancial
literacy, and the demand of advice. Kramer (2016) reports that households with higher condence in their
own nancial literacy are generally less likely to seek professional advice, while we nd, more specically,
that they are less likely to fully delegate their investment decisions.
We add to this literature by showing the di¤erent impact of test-based and self-assessed degrees of
nancial literacy on the control activity that investors exert on advisors. More self-condent investors are
more likely to control their advisorsactivity. Instead, the test-based level of nancial literacy inuences
the mechanism of control that investors put in place. Those with the highest degree of test-based nancial
literacy directly monitor their advisors, while the least nancially literate ones are more likely to seek a
second experts opinion.
Another strand of literature investigates the choice by the investors to follow or not professional advice.
Some authors study whether the degree of nancial education a¤ects the likelihood to seek advice.
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) highlight that the mere availability of unbiased nancial advice is a necessary
but not su¢ cient condition for beneting retail investors. They nd that investors who lack nancial
sophistication and trust are less likely to seek advice, even when this is unbiased and o¤ered for free.
Calcagno and Monticone (2015) nd that investors with higher nancial literacy are more likely to consult
nancial advisors than investors with a low degree of nancial literacy because the former anticipate that
they will receive valuable information from advisors.
There is some evidence that investors do not follow advice even when it has been certied as unbiased.
Hacketal et al. (2010) analyze investor decisions to follow a recommendation that is truthfully certied as
unbiased. Studying the trading behavior of the retail clients of a German brokerage rm, the authors show
that the greater the investors nancial knowledge and perception of conicts of interest, the less likely
the investor is to follow the experts advice. This result is also conrmed by Stolper and Walter (2015),
regarding basic retirement choices and the insurance of major life risks.
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Our paper suggests that both the choices to seek and to follow professional advice can be driven by the
availability of a¤ordable control mechanisms. Investors who do not delegate their portfolio management
because of a lack of trust (Gennaioli et al., 2015) may not follow or even not ask for advice in the rst place,
if they anticipate the advisors bias cannot be reduced either by asking for a second experts opinion or by
directly monitoring the advisorsrecommendation.
3 Data and preliminary results
The empirical analysis relies on the 2007 Unicredit Survey (UCS), which draws from the population of clients
of one of the three largest European banking groups.7 The 2007 wave interviewed 1,676 individuals with a
current account in one of the banks of the Unicredit Group based in Italy. The sample consists of clients
in the age group 2175 years, holding a current account and at least 10,000 euros. Due to these two last
restrictions, the UCS over-samples rich and old investors with respect to the Italian population.8 The UCS
goal is to study retail customersnancial behavior and their expectations towards the bank. It provides
detailed information on households demographic structure, labour market position, individual nancial
assets holding (both within and outside the bank), and income. Furthermore, the survey contains data on
the attitudes towards saving, nancial investment, risk propensity and, more importantly for our purposes,
on the degree of nancial literacy of households and their relation with banks and nancial advisors. In
particular, the survey explicitly measures the degree of trust of the respondents in their nancial advisor,
and the nature and frequency of their interaction. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables
considered in our analysis.9
The sample selected for our study includes only account holders who report that Unicredit is their main
or only bank, leaving us with 1,581 observations. After accounting for sample selection, we focus on 1,116
investors holding risky assets,10 representing about 70% of the entire sample. Overall, the UCS sample covers
7The UCS survey was repeated for the last time in 2009, but this last wave contained only a very limited number of questions,
mostly concerning the respondentsdegree of risk aversion. Therefore, we could not exploit this last wave for our purposes. By
comparing the 2007 and 2009 waves, Guiso et al. (2013) nd that risk aversion increased substantially after the nancial crisis
of 2008.
8Guiso and Jappelli (2009) report that the individuals in the UCS sample are older than in the SHIW (Bank of Italys Survey
on Household Income and Wealth). Throughout the paper, we compare some of our basic ndings with the ones contained in
SHIW, in CONSOB (2016) and in Gentile et al. (2016), which are all based on representative samples of the Italian population.
9Further information concerning the UCS can be found in Guiso and Jappelli (2009), and Calcagno and Monticone (2015).
10The survey considers as risky assets: bonds, stocks, mutual funds, insurance-based investment products, index funds,
personalised portfolio management and derivatives.
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individuals who participate more in nancial markets than the general Italian population.11 Although these
data are not representative of the Italian population, we believe that they are well suited to answer our key
research question, i.e., whether investors seeking professional advice exert some form of control over it, and
if so, which one. Indeed, even though the UCS does not cover households without a current account and
those belonging to the lowest wealth percentiles, these are unlikely to hold risky assets (van Rooij et al.,
2011) and to demand professional advice (Hacketal et al., 2012).
The main variables of interest for our analysis are related to characteristics of the investor, such as trust
in advisors and nancial knowledge, as well as to characteristics of the investor-advisor relation. Please refer
to Appendix A, for a precise denition of all the variables presented in Table 1 and for the precise wording
of the survey questions.
3.1 Summary statistics
The degree of trust in advisors is obtained from the answer (on a scale of one to ve) to a specic question
on the investors level of trust in bank or nancial advisors. The median level of trust is quite high (4 over
5), as well as its standard deviation (0.905). We use two measures of nancial literacy: a test-based (or
objective) measure, and a self-assessed (or subjective) measure. The objective measure of nancial literacy is
constructed as in Guiso and Jappelli (2009) and Calcagno and Monticone (2015): it is related to the correct
answer to eight questions regarding ination, interest rate compounding, risk diversication, and products
riskiness, similarly to the questions in van Rooij et al. (2011) and Kramer (2016). The overall distribution
of the correct answers is shown in Fig. 1. The average respondent answers correctly to 4.6 questions and
the median number of correct answers is ve. Our test-based degree of nancial literacy is higher than the
one obtained by Gentile et al. (2016) on a sample representative of the whole Italian population: this was
largely expected, since the literature widely reports a positive relation between nancial literacy and wealth
(van Rooij et al., 2011, among others).
The degree of self-assessed nancial knowledge is equal to the self-reported ability to manage nancial
investment (on a scale of one to ve) relative to the average. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) and Kramer
(2016) show a frequent substantial mismatch between individualsself-assessed knowledge and their actual
knowledge. Specically for the UCS sample, Guiso and Jappelli (2009) nd that these two measures are only
weakly correlated and can therefore have independent predictive power. From Table 2, which reports the
11When considering the entire Italian population, the level of nancial markets participation is 55% (CONSOB, 2016).
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correlation matrix of the relevant regressors (and instruments) considered in our analysis, we can observe that
the correlation coe¢ cient between self-assessed and test-based nancial literacy is statistically signicant
and equal to 0.330. The pattern of correlations of other variables matches what previously found in the
literature: nancial competence is positively associated with income, education, nancial sector employment,
experience in nancial markets, and negatively associated with risk aversion and the female dummy (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2007; Hacketal et al., 2012).
The survey provides information on other characteristics of the investoradvisor relationship that are
crucial for our analysis. Specically, it contains information on the way individuals manage their nancial
investments, that is, whether they decide autonomously ("Self"), ask for advisor counselling but decide
independently ("Advice"), or fully delegate their choice to a professional advisor ("Delegation"). In Table
3, we report the percentages of investors falling in these three categories, for the full sample of investors
having Unicredit as main bank, as well as for the subsample of those holding risky assets. Overall, 63% of
the investors for which Unicredit is the main bank rely on professional counselling, either by "Advice" or
by "Delegation". The fraction of investors choosing "Advice" is the largest, representing the 48% of the full
sample and the 69% of investors holding risky assets. Those choosing "Delegation" represent 14% of the
full sample and the 20% of the investors holding risky assets.
Moreover, the UCS reports whether the respondents have ever asked the bank about products managed
by other banks or nancial institutions (variable "Second Opinion") and how often they meet the nancial
advisor at the bank (variable "Monitoring"). Concerning the "Second Opinion", only 6% of the whole sample
has ever asked their main bank, i.e. Unicredit, for products proposed by other banks, while the median
respondent never did so (see Table 1).
To measure the frequency of meetings between investors and their advisors, we adopt a three-category
ordered variable equal to 0 (="Rarely") if the frequency of meetings is lower than once a year, 1 (="Some-
times") if the investors meets the advisor from once a year to once every three months, and 2 (="Frequently")
if the meetings are more at least one per month. In Table 1, we observe that the median frequency is 1, that
is, that the median respondent meets the advisor less frequently than once every quarter but more than
once per year. In our empirical analysis, we use "Second Opinion" and "Monitoring" to seize the control
mechanisms which are the key focus of our paper.
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3.2 Preliminary results
From Table 3 we observe that the higher the level of trust in the advisor, the more likely the investor fully
delegates his choice to the latter. This preliminary evidence supports the model developed by Gennaioli
et al. (2015): Investors who trust their advisors more are also more likely to invest in risky assets.
The level of trust is likely to be correlated with other variables inuencing the way investors make their
decisions, notably their nancial competence. Table 3 also reports the level of test-based and self-assessed
nancial knowledge for the three groups of investors choosing the di¤erent management styles, i.e. "Self",
"Advice" and "Delegation", respectively. Low levels of nancial literacy, either test-based or self-assessed,
predict a higher probability to fully delegate investment decisions to professional advisors.12
To assess more precisely the e¤ect of trust and nancial competence on the investors demand for
advice, we consider a multivariate regression setting that includes the standard control variables used in the
literature: demographics, income, wealth, the experience with the nancial sector, and the area of residence.
Given that the UCS asks only respondents who hold risky assets how they manage their investment, we
estimate an ordered probit model with sample selection. Table 4 presents the results of this regression model.
In column (1) of Table 4, we report the estimates of a probit model in which investors either hold risky
assets or not. We use the level of risk aversion as exclusion restriction here. More risk-averse investors are
less likely to hold risky assets, as expected. In addition, the test-based level of nancial literacy has a strong
positive impact on holding risky assets, as in (Guiso and Jappelli, 2009; van Rooij et al., 2011; Clark et al.,
2016), as does the measure of self-assessed nancial capability.
In columns (2a) to (2c) of Table 4, we present the e¤ects of trust, test-based nancial literacy, and self-
assessed nancial competence on the way investors use professional counselling. We run a Heckman ordered
probit model in which the dependent variable is, respectively, "Self" (column (2a)), "Advice" (column (2b)),
or "Delegation" (column (2c)). The level of trust increases the probability of full delegation, as predicted
by Gennaioli et al. (2015), while it decreases the probabilities of both asking for advice and investing
autonomously. While both nancial literacy and self-assessed nancial knowledge drive the choice to hold
risky assets, only the latter appears to have a signicant impact on the choice to rely on professional advice,
consistent with Kramer (2016).
12The relation between nancial competence and the choice to self-direct portfolio investment is less clear-cut. While higher
self-condence seems to predict a higher probability to decide autonomously rather than seeking advice, test-based nancial
literacy points to the opposite direction: a higher nancial literacy is associated with investors seeking advice but deciding
autonomously.
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Investors who received professional advice and spent time with their advisors are more likely to develop
a higher level of nancial sophistication and a di¤erent degree of trust in the advisor. This consideration
suggests that trust and nancial competence may be endogenous with respect to the investor choice. To
address this potential endogeneity of trust and nancial literacy, we report, in columns (3) and (4a) to (4c)
of Table 4, the instrumented version of the previous model.13 We instrument the level of trust in advisors
with two variables capturing the general level of trust.14 To instrument nancial literacy, we adopt the
regional level of nancial literacy derived from the Bank of Italys SHIW and a dummy variable indicating
whether the head of household was in the group of best students when attending school at ages 1114.15
The regressorscorrelation matrix of Table 2 also conrms that the instruments are signicantly positively
correlated with the endogenous variables. Dealing with ordered probit models, we adopt the control function
approach, that is, a twostage residual inclusion (2SRI) estimation, as described by Wooldridge (2010).16
Also this instrumented version of the ordered probit model conrms the positive role of trust in the choice
to fully delegate.17
4 The control mechanisms: direct investor monitoring and search for a
second opinion
The key contribution of our paper is identifying the disciplining mechanisms, if any, that investors put in
place in order to control the advisors activity.
Given the similarities between nancial advice and credence services suggested by Gennaioli et al. (2015),
we refer to Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) to predict the behavior of wary investors asking for advice.
Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) present a model of standard credence goods where clients can discipline an
experts activity only by seeking a second professional opinion that conrms the recommendation previously
13The instrumental variable approach is implemented in the selection equation, since the WuHausman test of endogeneity
rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity of the two (potentially endogenous) regressors in the selection equation (p-value=0.00), but
not in the outcome equation (p-value=0.12).
14See Appendix A for further details on the instruments.
15Note that the number of observations for the instrumented version of the selection and outcome equations drops from
1,581 and 1,116, to 1,550 and 1,098, respectively. This is due to missing observations (31 in the full sample, 18 in the selected
sample) after instrumenting individualsnancial literacy with the average regional nancial level in the SHIW dataset (it being
impossible to associate any Italian birth region for clients born abroad).
16Since the tted residuals from the rst-stage are included in the second stage-regression as a additional regressors, the
standard errors need to be corrected (Wooldridge, 2010, pp.126129). Standard error correction is achieved by bootstrapping
the relevant equation estimation.
17Since the system of equations is over-identied, we report, at the bottom of Table 3, standard test statistics that conrm
the validity of the adopted instruments.
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received. For standard credence services such as medical advice, the cost of checking whether the doctors
recommendation is accurate is too high for most patients. This cost is likely to be similar across patients
endowed with di¤erent levels of education, except for those who studied medicine. Instead, for a service
such as nancial advice, the degree of investor competence could play a role in the strategic interaction
between advisor and client (Collins, 2012; van Rooij et al., 2011; Hung and Yoong, 2013). More nancially
educated investors are better able to nd good advisors (Hacketal et al., 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014),
to understand better the characteristics of the advised portfolios (Bucher-Koenen and Koenen, 2011), and
generally pay lower costs in evaluating a recommendation. Instead of relying on second opinions, these
investors can verify the accuracy of the advisors choice by directly monitoring the experts activity at a
cost that decreases with their degree of nancial literacy.
We report in Table 5 the percentages of investors who enact any form of control on the advisors activity
relative to the sample of investors holding risky assets and relying on some form of professional counselling,
either "Advice" or "Delegation" (i.e., we exclude those who invest autonomously, "Self").18 We observe that
about 74% of these investors do not exert any form of control on the advisors activity. This evidence suggests
that about three quarters of investors consulting an advisor display some form of inertia (Bhattacharya et al.,
2012; Stolper and Walter, 2015), or they are unaware of the agency bias of professional advisors (as naive
investors in Woodward and Hall, 2012; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009, 2012c). About 23% of investors monitor
the advisor directly, while 7% choose the second opinion as a disciplining device. Interestingly, only a small
subsample (3.7%) exerts both types of controls, i.e., direct monitoring and search for a second opinion,
which in general are selected alternatively (19.2% and 3.2%, respectively).
On the basis of these observations, we formulate our rst main empirical prediction.
Hypothesis 1: among investors who hold risky assets and rely on some form of professional counselling,
those who are more aware of the advisors bias are more prone to control the advisors behavior.
We conjecture that awareness of the advisors bias is correlated with the investorsdegree of nancial
knowledge. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) argue that less literate households may be less aware of the agency
bias of professional nancial advisors, and therefore they may not discipline them. Several other papers nd
that also the self-assessed degree of nancial knowledge a¤ects households nancial behavior. Kramer (2016)
shows that investors with a higher condence in their own nancial literacy are less likely to seek professional
18Note that the number of individuals in this sub-sample (992) is equal to the number of investors holding risky assets (1116)
minus the number of investors choosing "Self " (124), that is 11.11% of 1116, as from Table 3.
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advice. Allgood and Walstad (2016) report evidence that the subjective degree of nancial knowledge has
predictive power over the test-based measure of nancial knowledge to explain nancial behavior. Therefore,
to test this rst hypothesis against the data, we check how the subjective and objective measures of nancial
literacy a¤ect the likelihood that investors exert some form of control over advisorsrecommendation.
Hypothesis 2: among investors who hold risky assets and rely on some form of professional counselling,
those with low-cost information production are more likely to directly monitor the advisor, while investors
with high-cost information production are more likely to search for a second opinion.
We test this second hypothesis against the data: we expect more literate investors to directly monitor the
advisors activity and less literate ones to use a second opinion device to discipline the advisors behavior.
To test these two predictions, we need to perform a further selection step among investors holding risky
assets in order to exclude those who invest without any professional counselling. Building on the model
of Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), we construct a measure proxying for the expected payo¤ the investor
earns by referring to a professional advisor. While the expected benet of seeking advice is proportional
to the quality of the advice, the disciplining cost depends on the investors ability to control the advisors
activity. A rational investor asks for advice only if the expected benet of doing so exceeds the expected
cost. Hence, we should observe that investors obtaining lower benets from advice or paying higher control
costs are less likely to ask for advice. We measure the net benet of asking for advice with the variable
Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate.19 A client is predicted to have high expected payo¤ of advice/delegation
if, in choosing a bank, he highly values a large variety of products, competitiveness of prices and product
performance as well as consultantscompetence, and, at the same time, he considers the proximity to home
and the availability of telephone/internet services as means to reduce costs.
In Table 6 and 6a, we run a Heckman probit regression with double sample selection. In the rst column,
we report the result of the rst sample selection, which restricts to investors holding risky assets. Column (2)
shows the results of the second selection equation, which identies investors who ask for nancial counselling.
In particular, in Table 6, we investigate the behavior of investors choosing "Advice", while in Table 6a we
investigate the behavior of investors choosing "Advice/Delegation". The exclusion restriction adopted in
the second selection level is precisely the Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate: the larger this payo¤, the more
likely the investor asks for nancial advice. Indeed, we nd that this measure signicantly explains (coe¤.
= 0.070) the choice of relying on professional counselling. The level of trust also has a very strong, positive
19See Appendix A, for details on the construction of this variable.
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e¤ect on this decision.
As a proxy measure of direct monitoring, we use the frequency of meetings between investors and their
advisors, i.e. the variable "Monitoring". We interpret frequent meetings as a signal of investors following
closely the work of their advisor, repeatedly asking him for information and clarications, therefore pushing
the latter to spend time on his case.20
To capture the fact that an investor seeks for a second opinion, we use the variable "Second Opinion", a
binary question asking whether the respondent ever asked their bank about products provided by other banks
or nancial institutions. We interpret a positive answer to this question as a signal that the investor controls
advisorsrecommendations through a comparison mechanism, i.e., asking to a second expert: Investors who
ask their advisor at Unicredit products sold by other banks reveal to be aware of the existence of these
products and, possibly, their intention to compare di¤erent products before purchasing one of them. These
investors are likely to use the same attitude with respect to the products o¤ered by Unicredit.21
In columns (3a) to (3c) of Table 6, we observe that a higher test-based measure of nancial literacy
increases the probability that investors frequently meet the advisor (coe¤.= 0.182). The objective measure of
nancial literacy is instead negatively correlated with the probability of rarely (coe¤.= -0.108) or sometimes
(coe¤.= -0.074) meeting the advisor. These results bring evidence in favour of our second hypothesis :
investors with high nancial literacy are more likely to monitor the activity of advisors by themselves. The
self-assessed measure of nancial literacy instead does not a¤ect signicantly the monitoring activity directly
performed by the investor.
According to our second prediction, less literate investors are expected to discipline the advisor activity
by seeking a second opinion (Pesendorfer and Wolinsky, 2003). In column (4) of Table 6, we see that the sign
of the coe¢ cient for the objective measure of nancial literacy is negative as expected, but not statistically
di¤erent from zero. Instead, the degree of self-assessed nancial knowledge is positively and signicantly
related to the search of a second opinion.
In Table 6a, we run the same analysis on all investors relying on professional advice, i.e. on those
investors choosing either "Advice" or "Delegation". The results (see columns (3a)-(3c)) conrm the positive
e¤ect of the test-based degree of nancial literacy on the intensity of the monitoring activity, as in Table 6.
20We acknowledge that this variable may also reect the frequency of trading. In Table 10, we specically deal with this
issue. Please, refer to Section 4.1.1 for a thorough discussion.
21 In Section 4.1.2, we extensively discuss the interpretation of this variable and its pertinence as a proxy measure of the
search for a second opinion.
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From Table 5, we learn that only very few investors adopt a second opinion mechanism. We conjecture
that the limited number of observations whose value is equal to one for the binary variable "Second opinion"
may be responsible for the lack of statistical signicance of the nancial literacy coe¢ cient. In particular,
these very few observations are dispersed across the eight possible values taken by the nancial literacy
variable. A re-coding of the nancial literacy variable in three main segments (i.e.,. low, medium and
high) may help to improve its predicting power, if any, on the second opinion variable.22 We collect the
results under this alternative specication in Tables 7 and 7a, where the subsamples of investors choosing,
respectively, "Advice".or "Advice/Delegation" are considered.23
In columns (1a) to (2c) of Table 7, we observe that investors in the lowest percentiles of the distribution
are less likely to monitor directly (i.e., to meet frequently) their advisors (coe¤. = -0.130), while those in
the medium and high percentiles of the distribution are more likely to do so (coe¤. = 0.181 and 0.261,
respectively). The models in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 also show that the coe¢ cients of the re-coded
nancial literacy variable are statistically signicant and then predict the search for second opinion. In
column (3), we observe that the investors at the bottom of the distribution of nancial literacy are more
likely to control their advisor by seeking a second opinion (coe¤.: = 0.085), while medium and highly
literate investors are both less likely to search for a second opinion (coe¤.=-0.091 and -0.072 in column (4),
respectively). The self-assessed degree of nancial knowledge positively a¤ects both the likelihood of direct
monitoring (columns (1c) and (2c)) and the likelihood to search for a second opinion in a highly signicant
way (columns (3) and (4)).
In Table 7a, we perform the same analysis as in Table 7, but relative to investor choosing "Advice/Delegation".
While the ndings relative to direct monitoring are qualitatively conrmed, the coe¢ cients of nancial lit-
eracy (low, medium or high) relative to the search for second opinion are no longer signicant. These
ndings again corroborate the credence service view taken in the paper: only investors who ask for advice
but manage their portfolio autonomously seek a second opinion to discipline the rst advisor.
22 In Figures 1 and 2, we plot the frequency and cumulative distribution functions, respectively, of the variable Financial
Literacy. Since the variable is discrete, we are not allowed to choose any desired percentile level. The Financial Literacy_low
bracket includes investors scoring at most three out of eight correct answers, representing approximately the lowest 20% of
the selected subsample. The Financial Literacy_medium bracket includes investors scoring four (median) or ve out of eight
correct answers. The Financial Literacy_high bracket includes those investors scoring at least six out of eight correct answers,
representing approximately the highest 10% of the distribution. In Section 4.2, we also discuss ndings relying on alternative
measures of nancial literacy.
23We report, in Table 7 and 7a, only the results relative to the outcome equations - "Monitoring" and "Second opinion" -
that are estimated, as in Table 6 and 6a, following the Heckman ordered probit models with double sample selection and 2SRI
estimation model to treat endogeneity.
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Altogether, Tables 7 and 7a show a positive and signicant correlation between the self-assessed degree
of nancial literacy and the probability of exerting some form of control over advisors, either by asking
a second opinion or through direct monitoring. This result uncovers two distinct and independent roles
for the self-assessed nancial competence and the test-based nancial literacy in the strategic interaction
between investor and advisor. The degree of self-condence in nancial topics seems to be able to capture
the investors awareness of the advisors bias. Among investors who ask for advice but decide autonomously,
those who are more condent in their own nancial knowledge indeed exert some form of control over the
advisor activity. (Hypothesis 1). The test-based nancial knowledge drives instead the choice of the control
mechanism put in place by the investor. The ones at the top of the distribution of the test-based nancial
literacy distribution discipline their advisors through direct monitoring, while those at the bottom control
their advisorsbehavior by comparing di¤erent recommendations (Hypothesis 2).
Up to this point, we have implicitly assumed that a client alternatively chooses one of the two disciplining
devices, i.e., direct control or the search for a second opinion, in order to obtain an accurate recommendation
from the advisor. Table 5 highlights that most investors holding risky assets do not put in place any form
of control, and that a very small fraction of investors adopt both disciplining channels. In Table 8, we
investigate the investorscharacteristics predicting these two behaviors, i.e. absence of control and reliance
on both forms of control; in Table 9, we exclude from the sample those investors choosing both control
channels.
In column (1) and (2) of Table 8, we study the characteristics of investors who do not exert any control,
i.e., those who do not meet frequently the advisor ("Monitoring" 6= 2) and do not search for a second opinion
("Second opinion" = 0). The degree of test-based nancial literacy does not predict signicantly this behav-
ior. However, the non-controlling investors have a signicantly lower self-condence in their own nancial
knowledge. This nding is again consistent with Hypothesis 1: a high self-assessed nancial competence,
being likely associated with a stronger awareness of the advisors bias, predicts a higher propensity to control
the advisors activity. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 report the e¤ect of trust and nancial competence
on the probability that investors implement both control mechanisms: interestingly, neither the test-based
nor the self-assessed nancial competence signicantly predict this behavior. Finally, Table 9 presents the
same regression analysis as in Table 7, but excluding from the sample those (29) investors choosing both
disciplining channels. Our ndings are conrmed: investors belonging to the lower percentiles of nancial
literacy are still signicantly associated with a more intense search for a second opinion (coe¤.=0.063) while
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more literate investors are more likely associated with direct monitoring (coe¤.=0.170).
4.1 Additional tests on the measures of monitoring and second opinion
The variables that we have adopted in order to measure the intensity of the investorsmonitoring activity
and their search for a second opinion may raise some questions in terms of interpretation. In this section we
discuss the pertinence of these measures more in depth.
4.1.1 Direct monitoring activity
We proxy the intensity of the direct monitoring activity using the frequency of meetings between investor
and advisor. We interpret frequent meetings as a signal of investors following closely the work of their
advisor, thus pushing the latter to accurately study their needs. Alternatively, one can argue that investors
meet their advisors more frequently if they want to revise their portfolio more often. In columns (1a) to
(1c) of Table 10, we control for the frequency of trading in the regression specication of Table 6.24 The
variable "Frequency of trading" is re-coded in a three-category ordered variable ("Rarely", "Sometimes",
"Frequently") that closely matches the monitoring measure. As expected, frequency of trading a¤ects the
monitoring intensity (i.e., the frequency of meetings) in a positive and signicant way. However, the degree of
nancial literacy is still positively and signicantly related to monitoring. The economic size of the coe¢ cient
linking these two variables is only marginally reduced if compared to Table 6 (from 0.182 to 0.166), and
this conrms the e¤ect of test-based nancial literacy on the investors monitoring activity.25 In order to
rule out a possible spurious correlation between nancial literacy and the frequency of trading, in columns
(2a) to (2c) of Table 11, we consider the latter as a dependent variable. The results show that nancial
literacy does not a¤ect trading frequency in a signicant way. Consistently with the literature (Grinblatt
and Keloharju, 2009), the frequency of trading is instead signicantly related with the self-assessed level of
nancial knowledge.
If, as we claim, the relation between nancial literacy and frequency of meeting is due to the need to
monitor the advisors activity, its strength should be weaker the higher the trust in the advisor and/or the
satisfaction with his activity. In Table 11, we study these testable implications. In columns (1a) to (1c) of
24Table 10, 11 and 12 follow a regression specication close to Table 6.
25Note that we did not include the "frequency of trading" as a regressor in the main specication to avoid a further source of
endogeneity due to reverse causality: the advisor might increase the (need of) frequency of meeting with the investor in order
to increase the frequency of trading and thus earn more from transactions.
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Table 11, we include the interaction between nancial literacy and trust in the advisor. If our conjecture is
correct, we expect a negative sign of the interaction variables coe¢ cient: this is indeed the case, although
the coe¢ cient is (marginally) non signicant (p-value=0.11).
In columns (2a) to (2c), we consider instead the interaction between nancial literacy and the level of
satisfaction in the advisors activity, measured on a scale 1 to 5.26 One can argue that the intensity of the
monitoring activity also depends on the level of satisfaction of the investors when dealing with his advisor.
A higher satisfaction is likely to increase the frequency of meeting, due to a component of pleasure of the
investor to chat with his advisor. This is conrmed by our data: a higher degree of satisfaction signicantly
increases the frequency of the meetings between the investor and the advisor. However, the coe¢ cient of the
interaction term between nancial literacy and satisfaction of advice is negative and statistically di¤erent
from zero: the higher is the satisfaction with the service provided, the less compelling is the role of nancial
literacy in monitoring the advisor.
The relationship between nancial literacy and satisfaction of advice is a priori far from obvious. A
higher nancial literacy might induce the advisor to provide better recommendations, as emphasized by the
literature stressing the complementary relationship between advisor and investor (Calcagno and Monticone,
2015). Investors with higher nancial literacy might therefore end up being relatively more satised in the
advisors activity. Conversely, if the clients higher nancial literacy is associated with a closer monitoring
behavior, then the probability to detect opportunistic deviations of the advisors might be higher and the
satisfaction for the nancial services might be lower. A negative relation between the test-based measure of
nancial literacy and the level of satisfaction therefore is consistent with our conjecture that highly literate
investors monitor advisors directly. In column (3) of Table 11, we test this conjecture. The variable "Low
satisfaction advice" is equal to one if the respondents satisfaction is low (1 to 3, out of 5), and 0, otherwise.
This variable is associated as expected with a low level of trust in the advisor and, more importantly for
our purposes, with a high level of nancial literacy.
As a further robustness check, we consider an alternative proxy measure for the intensity of the monitor-
ing activity, that is, the dichotomous variable "Monitoring_1". This variable is equal to one if the investor
meets frequently with the advisor (variable "Monitoring" = 2) and is not satised with the services provided
(variable "Low satisfaction advice" = 1), while it equals zero otherwise. We present the results in column
(4) of Table 11. The impact of the test-based degree of nancial literacy on this alternative measure of mon-
26See Appendix A, for a precise denition of this variable.
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itoring is positive, thus providing further support to our prediction that high objective nancial knowledge
increases the direct monitoring activity.
4.1.2 Search for a second opinion
The variable "Second opinion" is constructed using the answer to a binary question asking whether the
respondent ever asked their bank about products provided by other banks or nancial institutions. We
interpret a positive answer to this question as a signal that the investor compares di¤erent products and
di¤erent recommendations, as by seeking a second opinion. However, this survey question does not directly
reveal whether the investor actually consults with di¤erent intermediaries. Luckily, in the questionnaire
the respondents are also explicitly asked whether they or their relatives make transactions with other
banks/nancial intermediaries beyond Unicredit Bank. Therefore, we restrict our sample to respondents
who a¢ rmatively answer this question and test whether the less literate investors in this sub-group search
for a second opinion. We report the results in Table 12.
Columns #a refer to the subgroup of respondents who assess to directly deal with other intermediaries,
while #b refer to respondents stating that their relatives are involved with other banks. In columns (1a)
and (1b), we show that the objective degree of nancial literacy has a negative and signicant e¤ect on
the likelihood to search for a second opinion. The self-assessed measure of nancial knowledge is instead
positively and signicantly related to this control mechanisms. These ndings conrm the predictions
formulated in Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Those clients who report to have contact with multiple banks or nancial intermediaries are further
asked the reason for this choice. The respondent is told a list of possible answers among which one states:
"to make banks compete and therefore to get better conditions". We consider a positive answer to this
question as a signal of the respondents intention to compare various o¤ers made by di¤erent nancial
intermediaries. We use this variable as an alternative proxy of the search of a second opinion ("Second
opinion_1")27 and we report the results in columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 12. We nd that the coe¢ cient
of the test-based nancial literacy measure is negative and statistically signicant, thus conrming that a
lower level of nancial literacy is associated with a more intense search for a second opinion.
27See Appendix A, for a precise denition of this variable.
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4.2 Robustness
This section presents a series of additional analyses that verify the robustness of our ndings to di¤erent
specications of the main variables. We check the robustness of the results illustrated in the previous section
to the denition of our two main regressors, namely, Trust in advisor and Financial Literacy.28
Table 4a reports the robustness results of Table 4. Here we replace the variable Trust in advisor taking
the values one to ve with the binary variable Trust in advisor_1. The e¤ect of trust is further reinforced,
pointing to a robust correlation between trust and delegation.
Tables 6b-6c and 7b-7c report the robustness results of Table 6 and 7 when the variable Financial
Literacy is replaced by two alternative specications of the same variable  Financial Literacy_1 and
Financial Literacy_2  obtained after excluding the question that recorded, respectively, the highest and
lowest scores for the corrected answersresults, as detailed in Appendix A.29 The main ndings of Table
6 and 7 are conrmed: Investors more condent in their nancial competence are more prone to control
the advisors behavior (Hypothesis 1). Investors featuring a high level of test-based nancial literacy are
more likely to directly monitor the advisors activity, while investors at the bottom of the nancial literacy
distribution are more likely to ask for a second opinion to verify the recommendations received previously
(Hypothesis 2).
5 Conclusions
This paper empirically investigates whether investors control the recommendations they receive from their
nancial advisors and, if so, which control mechanism they choose.
We nd that, irrespective of their level of nancial education, investors with high trust in their advisors
are more likely to fully delegate their nancial decisions, as predicted by Gennaioli et al. (2015). A large
fraction of investors however seeks nancial counselling but makes decisions autonomously. If we restrict
our analysis to these latter investors, we observe that those with a higher self-assessed nancial competence
are more prone to exert some form of control over their advisors. The degree of test-based nancial literacy
28Tables 13a, 13b, and 13c report additional robustness results for the second selection equation of Tables 6. Tables 13a
and 13b report ndings under two alternative specications of the exclusion restriction, that is, the measure Expected payo¤ of
advice/delegate (see Appendix A for details), while Table 13c shows the results under the alternative specication of trust. All
three tables deliver results qualitatively similar to those in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.
29Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b plot the frequency distribution and the cumulative distribution functions of the two alternative
measures of Financial Literacy.
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inuences instead the control mechanism the investor enacts. Investors with the highest level of test-based
nancial literacy verify the accuracy of expert recommendations directly, by frequently meeting with him.
Investors with the lowest level of test-based nancial literacy instead seek a second expert opinion that
conrms the recommendation previously received, hence putting pressure on the rst advisor to provide
good advice. This latter disciplining mechanism conrms that nancial advice can be considered as a
credence service (Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003)). Our results suggest that policy interventions that
improve disclosure of product characteristics can be benecial for highly knowledgeable investors, but not
for the less literate ones. To help unsophisticated investors exert some form of control over the activity of
professional advisors, it may be more e¤ective to facilitate access to experts other than the investors own
bank ones, and to provide them with standardized and centralized information over nancial products.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports standard descriptive statistics of the variables considered throughout the analysis. Note that
the estimation sample may vary across variables, as the tree-structure of the questionnaire implies that some questions
are asked only to sub-samples of clients.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev Min Max
Variables in main specification
Trust in advisor 3.798 4 0.905 1 5
Financial Literacy 4.658 5 1.476 0 8
Self-assessed financial knowledge 2.877 2.9 0.846 1 5
Second Opinion 0.062 0 0.241 0 1
Second Opinion_1 0.135 0 0.342 0 1
Monitoring 1.187 1 0.645 0 2
Monitoring_1 0.018 0 0.134 0 1
Frequency of trading 0.759 1 0.728 0 2
Satisfaction advice 2.832 3 0.870 0 4
Risk aversion 2.886 3 0.719 1 4
Expected payoff of advice/delegate 0.674 1 0.469 0 1
Experience (years) 13.038 11 12.753 0 53
Finance sector 0.034 0 0.180 0 1
Financial wealth: 10-50 k 0.183 0 0.387 0 1
Financial wealth: 50-100 k 0.232 0 0.422 0 1
Financial wealth: 100-150 k 0.201 0 0.401 0 1
Financial wealth: 150-250 k 0.175 0 0.380 0 1
Financial wealth: 250-500 k 0.157 0 0.364 0 1
Financial wealth: >500 k 0.052 0 0.222 0 1
Individual income (thousands euro) 49.947 31 67.933 0.2 822
Female 0.306 0 0.461 0 1
Age 54.827 57 12.313 25 89
Years at school 12.381 13 3.905 0 20
Retired 0.336 0 0.473 0 1
Self-employed 0.267 0 0.442 0 1
Years at Unicredit: <1 0.011 0 0.103 0 1
Years at Unicredit: 1-5 0.100 0 0.300 0 1
Years at Unicredit: 6-10 0.187 0 0.390 0 1
Years at Unicredit: 11-20 0.236 0 0.425 0 1
Years at Unicredit: >20 0.466 0 0.499 0 1
North west 0.221 0 0.415 0 1
North east 0.288 0 0.453 0 1
Center 0.243 0 0.429 0 1
South-Islands 0.248 0 0.432 0 1
Variables in alternative specifications
Financial Literacy_1 4.143 4 1.353 0 7
Financial Literacy_2 4.530 5 1.417 0 7
Trust in advisor_1 0.729 1 0.444 0 1
Expected payoff of advice/delegate_1 0.194 0 0.395 0 1
Expected payoff of advice/delegate_2 0.690 1 0.463 0 1
Instruments
Regional Financial literacy (average) 1.577 1.498 0.335 0.781 1.961
School performance 0.166 0 0.373 0 1
Generalized trust_1 0.260 0 0.439 0 1
Generalized trust_2 4.187 4 0.853 1 5
Source: UCS (2007)
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of main regressors
This table reports the correlation matrix of main regressors and instruments. Statistically signicant correlation
coe¢ cients (at 10% condence interval) are reported in bold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Self-assessed financial knowledge (1) 1
Financial Literacy (2) 0.330 1
School performance (3) 0.149 0.134 1
Regional Financial literacy (average) (4) 0.102 0.100 -0.018 1
Trust in advisor (5) 0.057 0.000 0.014 0.028 1
Generalized trust_1 (6) 0.028 -0.012 0.033 -0.001 0.080 1
Generalized trust_2 (7) 0.088 0.146 0.127 -0.006 0.169 0.149 1
Risk aversion (8) -0.296 -0.105 -0.073 -0.013 -0.104 -0.019 -0.054 1
Expected payoff of advice/delegate (9) 0.143 0.118 -0.030 -0.020 0.090 -0.030 0.094 -0.082 1
Experience (years) (10) 0.296 0.252 0.113 0.203 0.093 -0.006 0.152 -0.109 0.067 1
Finance sector (11) 0.111 0.062 0.049 0.007 -0.052 0.042 0.021 -0.029 0.017 0.080 1
Years at school (12) 0.288 0.188 0.264 -0.118 0.013 0.086 0.162 -0.176 0.053 0.072 0.079 1
Individual income (log) (13) 0.245 0.124 0.092 0.016 -0.032 0.066 0.034 -0.142 -0.033 0.166 0.054 0.250 1
Age (14) -0.030 -0.031 0.015 0.083 0.088 -0.027 -0.034 0.081 -0.087 0.362 0.010 -0.242 0.027 1
Female (15) -0.212 -0.119 0.002 -0.011 0.094 -0.005 -0.004 0.143 -0.007 -0.139 -0.063 -0.029 -0.222 0.010 1
Source: UCS (2007)
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on trust, nancial literacy, self-assessed nancial knowledge,
and the demand for advice
Full sample
Percent Percent Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev
Demand for advice
Self 7.84 11.11 3.53 0.87 4.88 0.92 3.38 0.79
Advice 48.39 68.55 4.02 0.72 4.95 1.24 3.10 0.75
Delegation 14.36 20.34 4.39 0.67 4.56 1.34 2.68 0.82













Table 4. Demand for advice and trust
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of an ordered probit model with sample selection.
Column (1) reports results of the selection equation "Hold risky assets" while columns (2a)-(2c) report results of the
outcome equation "Self-Advice-Delegation" estimated as an Heckman ordered probit model with sample selection.
The endogenous regressors Financial Literacy and Trust in advisor are instrumented by Regional Financial literacy,
School performance, Generalized Trust (1) and Generalized Trust (2) (see Appendix A for details on the variables).
Consistently with the results of the Wu-Hausman test, the Instrumental Variable regression is implemented in the
selection equation. Tests of instrumentsvalidity are reported at the bottom of the table. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hold risky assets Self Advice Delegation Hold risky assets Self Advice Delegation
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c)
Trust in advisor 0.041 *** -0.089 *** -0.053 *** 0.142 *** 0.316 *** -0.085 *** -0.054 *** 0.139 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.013 )
Financial Literacy 0.042 *** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.224 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.007 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.009 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge 0.030 ** 0.019 ** 0.011 * -0.030 ** -0.051 ** 0.021 ** 0.014 ** -0.035 **
( 0.014 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.015 )
Risk aversion -0.064 *** -0.061 ***
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes
Macroarea yes yes
#obs 1581 1550
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.24
Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial  l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.12
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.84
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 12.10
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.58
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.75














Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007)..
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Table 5. Control mechanisms: an overview
This table reports the percentages of clients exerting di¤erent types of control on the advisors activity, within the
sample of investors holding risky assets but not investing completely autonomously (column (7)). The rst two columns
refer to investors exerting second opinion or direct monitoring. The third and fourth column refer, respectively, to
investors not exerting any control or exerting both forms of control. Column (5) and (6) refer to investors choosing
alternatively one control mechanism only (second opinion or direct monitoring, respectively).
second
opinion







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
69 227 733 37 32 190 992
7.0% 22.9% 73.9% 3.7% 3.2% 19.2% 100.0%




Table 6. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of an ordered probit model with double sample
selection. Column (1) reports results of the 1st level selection equation "Hold risky assets" while columns (2) reports
results of the 2nd level selection equation of seeking for nancial counseling (either "Advice" or "Delegation"). "Risk
aversion" is the exclusion restriction of the 1st level selection equation while "Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate"
is the exclusion restriction of the 2nd level selection equation. The columns (3a)-(3c) report results of the outcome
equation "Monitoring", estimated as an Heckman ordered probit model with double sample selection. The column (4)
reports results of the outcome equation "Second opinion", estimated as an Heckman probit model with double sample
selection. The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking advice and deciding autonomously
(advice only). The endogenous regressors Financial Literacy and Trust in advisor are instrumented by Regional
Financial literacy, School performance, Generalized Trust (1) and Generalized Trust (2) (see Appendix A for details
on the variables). Consistently with the results of the Wu-Hausman test reported, the Instrumental Variable regression
is implemented in the 1st level selection equation and for the "Monitoring" outcome equation. Tests of instruments
validity are reported at the bottom of the table. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
1st level selection 2nd level selection
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegate
Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4)
Trust in advisor 0.323 *** 0.148 *** 0.006 0.004 -0.011 0.046
( 0.064 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.105 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.178 ) ( 0.330 )
Financial Literacy 0.223 *** -0.019 -0.108 * -0.074 * 0.182 * -0.100
( 0.057 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.101 ) ( 0.074 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.049 * 0.040 * -0.034 -0.023 0.058 0.539 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.156 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate -0.036 0.070 **
( 0.024 ) ( 0.031 )
Risk aversion -0.060 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 1550 1098 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.18
Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.39 0.08 0.12
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.75
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 11.33
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.71
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.70













Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 6a. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion (Advice/Delegation)
This table reports ndings of the same analysis of Table 6, but relative to the overall sample (advice/delegation)
rather than to the subsample of those asking advice and deciding autonomously (advice only). Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
1st level selection 2nd level selection
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegate
Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4)
Trust in advisor 0.323 *** 0.148 *** 0.012 0.007 -0.019 -0.214
( 0.064 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.142 ) ( 0.276 )
Financial Literacy 0.223 *** -0.019 -0.117 ** -0.073 ** 0.191 ** 0.000
( 0.057 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.049 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.079 ) ( 0.066 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.049 * 0.040 * -0.019 -0.012 0.031 0.460 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.133 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate -0.036 0.070 **
( 0.024 ) ( 0.031 )
Risk aversion -0.060 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 1550 1098 704
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.17
Instrumented endogenous regressors : Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.39 0.08 0.12
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.75 2.57
                  p-value 0.00 0.04
              Trust in advisor 11.33 3.10
                  p-value 0.00 0.02
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.71 2.06









Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 7: Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion, by low, medium and high
nancial literacy (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of an ordered probit model with double sample
selection, as from columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking
advice and deciding autonomously (advice only). The variable Financial Literacy is considered split in the lowest,
medium and high percentiles (Financial Literacy_low, Financial Literacy_medium and Financial Literacy_high,
respectively). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor -0.024 -0.010 0.025 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.001
( 0.041 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.106 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.180 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.048 )
Financial Literacy_low -0.065 *** 0.053 -0.130 * 0.085 **
( 0.021 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.039 )
Financial literacy_medium -0.107 ** -0.074 ** 0.181 ** -0.091 **
( 0.051 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.040 )
Financial literacy_high -0.154 * -0.107 * 0.261 ** -0.072 *
( 0.079 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.043 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.010 -0.047 *** 0.116 *** -0.061 *** -0.042 *** 0.103 *** 0.083 *** 0.080 ***
( 0.109 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 510 510 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.19
Control mechanism (Advice only)
Monitoring Second opinion
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 7a. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion, by low, medium and high
nancial literacy (Advice/Delegation)
This table reports ndings of the same analysis of Table 7, but relative to the overall sample (advice/delegation)
rather than to the subsample of those asking advice and deciding autonomously (advice only). Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor -0.017 -0.011 0.028 -0.008 -0.005 0.013 -0.024 -0.036
( 0.087 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.142 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.143 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.038 )
Financial Literacy_low 0.091 ** 0.058 ** -0.149 ** 0.028
( 0.037 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.032 )
Financial literacy_medium -0.122 *** -0.077 *** 0.200 *** -0.037
( 0.042 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.033 )
Financial literacy_high -0.173 *** -0.109 *** 0.282 *** -0.008
( 0.064 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.102 ) ( 0.036 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.056 *** -0.035 *** 0.091 *** -0.048 *** -0.031 *** 0.079 *** 0.069 *** 0.065 ***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 704 704





Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 8: No control mechanism or both (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of a probit model with double sample selection,
as from columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The variable Financial Literacy is considered split in the lowest, medium
and high percentiles (Financial Literacy_low, Financial Literacy_medium and Financial Literacy_high, respectively).
The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking advice and deciding autonomously (advice only),
and investigates the characteristics predicting the probability of not exerting any control (columns (1) and (2)) and of
adopting both mechanisms of control (columns (3) and (4)). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor 0.170 0.175 0.008 -0.024
( 0.215 ) ( 0.216 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.158 )
Financial Literacy_low 0.117 0.023
( 0.090 ) ( 0.058 )
Financial literacy_medium -0.133 0.051
( 0.107 ) ( 0.105 )
Financial literacy_high -0.157 0.154
( 0.168 ) ( 0.133 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.134 *** -0.130 *** 0.038 0.014
( 0.037 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.029 )*** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 510 510 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.32
Control mechanism
none both
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 9: Alternative control mechanisms: Monitoring and Second opinion, by low, medium
and high nancial literacy (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of an ordered probit model with double sample
selection, as from columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The variable Financial Literacy is considered split in the lowest,
medium and high percentiles (Financial Literacy_low, Financial Literacy_medium and Financial Literacy_high,
respectively). The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking advice and deciding autonomously
(advice only) and excludes investors who choose both mechanisms of control. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor -0.015 -0.006 0.016 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.001 0.028
( 0.104 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.170 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.173 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.473 )
Financial Literacy_low 0.077 * 0.051 * -0.141 * 0.063 **
( 0.046 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.030 )
Financial literacy_medium -0.109 ** -0.061 * 0.170 ** -0.761 **
( 0.055 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.365 )
Financial literacy_high -0.138 -0.078 0.216 -0.790 *
( 0.087 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.135 ) ( 0.412 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.068 *** -0.037 *** 0.101 *** -0.061 *** -0.034 *** 0.095 *** 0.059 *** 0.714 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.218 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 481 481 481 481
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.25
Alternative control mechanism
Monitoring only Second opinion only
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 10. Further tests on the measures of control: Monitoring/1 (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of an ordered probit model with double sample
selection, as from columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking
advice and deciding autonomously (advice only). In columns (1a) to (1c), we add the frequency of trading variable
to the regressors predicting the probability of "Monitoring". In columns (2a) to (2c) we check how our regressors
predict the frequency of trading. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Frequency of trading
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Trust in advisor 0.010 0.006 -0.016 -0.045 0.016 0.030
( 0.101 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.166 ) ( 0.191 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.125 )
Financial Literacy (FL) -0.102 * -0.064 * 0.166 * -0.025 0.009 0.016
( 0.056 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.066 )
Frequency trading -0.134 *** -0.085 *** 0.218 ***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.023 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.136 *** 0.047 *** 0.088 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.032 )*** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes
Macroarea yes yes
#obs 510
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.07
Monitoring
510
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 11. Further tests on the measures of control: Monitoring/2 (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of an ordered probit model with double sample
selection, as from columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking
advice and deciding autonomously (advice only). In columns (1a) to (2c), the dependent variable is "Monitoring". In
columns (1a) to (1c) we consider the interaction between Financial Literacy and Trust in advisor. In columns (2a) to
(2c) we consider the interaction between Financial Literacy and the level of satisfaction with the nancial advisor. In
column 3, the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the satisfaction with the advisor is low (1-3), and
0 otherwise. In column 4, the dependent variable is "Monitoring_1", that is a binary variable equal to 1 if both the
investor monitors frequently (i.e., "Monitor" equal to 2), and the level of satisfaction with the advisor is low (1-3), 0
otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor -0.068 -0.048 0.116 0.029 0.020 -0.050 -0.264 *** -0.076 **
( 0.117 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.105 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.178 ) ( 0.069 ) ( 0.038 )
Financial Literacy (FL) -0.187 ** -0.130 ** 0.317 ** -0.176 ** -0.122 ** 0.298 *** 0.025 ** 0.030 ***
( 0.082 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.134 ) ( 0.069 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.113 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.008 )
FL*Trust in advisor 0.020 0.014 -0.034
( 0.013 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.021 )
Satisfaction advice -0.127 ** -0.088 ** 0.215 **
( 0.059 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.100 )
FL*Satisfaction advice 0.022 ** 0.015 ** -0.038 **
( 0.011 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.018 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.033 -0.023 0.055 -0.032 -0.022 0.054 -0.014 -0.003
( 0.028 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.014 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10 0.35 0.42
510 510
Monitoring
Interaction FL-Satisfaction adviceInteraction FL-Trust Monitoring_1Low satisfaction
advice
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 12. Further tests on the measures of control: Second opinion (Advice only)
This table reports the marginal e¤ects on conditional probability of a probit model with double sample selection,
as from columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The reported results are relative to the sub-sample of investors asking advice
and deciding autonomously (advice only) and who have relationships with more than one bank/intermediary. In
columns (1a) and (1b), the dependent variable is "Second opinion" analyzed in this restricted sample. In columns (2a)
and (2b), the dependent variable is "Second opinion_1", that is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent chooses
multiple banks/intermediaries to enforce competition. Columns (#a) refer to clients directly having relationships with
other banks/intermediaries (beyond Unicredit Bank). Columns (#b) refer to clients whose relatives have relationships
with other banks/intermediaries (beyond Unicredit Bank). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Respondent Relatives Respondent Relatives
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Trust in advisor 0.123 0.054 0.047 0.047
( 0.096 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.118 )
Financial Literacy -0.040 * -0.031 * -0.065 *** -0.065 ***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.025 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge 0.119 ** 0.119 *** 0.005 0.005
( 0.048 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.053 )
Experience 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003
( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
Finance sector 0.016 -0.178 0.131 0.131
( 0.172 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.144 ) ( 0.144 )*** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 158 248 158 158
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.14
sample of clients with multiple banks/intermediaries
Second opinion
Second opinion Second opinion_1
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and




Table 4a. Demand for advice and trust (robustness: "Trust in advisor_1")
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in Table 4. The variable Trust in advisor is
replaced here by its binary version, Trust in advisor_1 . The results of the Wu-Hausman tests suggests to instrument
endogenous regressors in both selection and outcome equations. Dependent variable and regression techniques are
the same as Table 3. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hold risky assets Self Advice Delegation
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Trust in advisor_1 0.800 *** -0.438 *** -0.257 *** 0.695 ***
( 0.160 ) ( 0.138 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.216 )
Financial Literacy 0.215 *** 0.023 0.014 -0.037
( 0.057 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.058 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.048 * 0.016 0.009 -0.025
( 0.026 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.026 )
Risk aversion -0.060 ***
( 0.014 ) *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes




Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial l iteracy Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.06
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.84 20.18
                  p-value 0.00 0.00
              Trust in advisor 8.56 16.27
                  p-value 0.00 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.23 1.27







Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 6b. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion (Advice only). Robustness:
Financial Literacy_1
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in Table 6. The variable Financial Literacy
is replaced by Financial Literacy_1 (see Appendix A for details on the construction of the variable). Dependent
variable and regression techniques are the same as Table 5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
1st level selection 2nd level selection
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegate
Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4)
Trust in advisor 0.290 *** 0.149 *** 0.026 0.018 -0.044 -0.002
( 0.068 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.107 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.181 ) ( 0.049 )
Financial Literacy_1 0.248 *** -0.013 -0.113 * -0.077 * 0.190 * -0.020 *
( 0.062 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.112 ) ( 0.011 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.046 * 0.036 * -0.037 -0.026 0.063 0.077 ***
( 0.025 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.022 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate -0.037 0.069 **
( 0.024 ) ( 0.031 )
Risk aversion -0.060 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 1550 1098 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.19
Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.41 0.09 0.14
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 8.15
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 11.33
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.28
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.87
-
0.39
outcome equation (Advice only)
Monitoring Second opinion







Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 6c. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion (Advice only). Robustness:
Financial Literacy_2
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in Table 6. The variable Financial Literacy
is replaced by Financial Literacy_2 (see Appendix A for details on the construction of the variable). Dependent
variable and regression techniques are the same as Table 5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
1st level selection 2nd level selection
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegate
Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4)
Trust in advisor 0.268 *** 0.451 *** 0.063 0.043 -0.106 0.009
( 0.074 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.187 ) ( 0.048 )
Financial Literacy_2 0.292 *** -0.075 * -0.187 ** -0.128 ** 0.316 ** -0.013
( 0.082 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.140 ) ( 0.012 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.078 ** 0.119 * 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.079 ***
( 0.036 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.023 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate -0.046 * 0.212 **
( 0.024 ) ( 0.096 )
Risk aversion -0.060 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 1550 1098 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.18
Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.41 0.05 0.13
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 6.76
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 11.33
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.50
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.78
2.49
-
outcome equation (Advice only)
Monitoring Second opinion







Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 7b. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion, by low, medium and high
nancial literacy (Advice only). Robustness: Financial Literacy_1
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in Table 7. The variable Financial Literacy
is replaced by Financial Literacy_1 (see Appendix A for details on the construction of the variable). Dependent
variable and regression techniques are the same as Table 7. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.005 -0.013 0.005 -0.001
( 0.105 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.178 ) ( 0.104 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.048 )
Financial Literacy_1_low 0.053 0.037 -0.090 0.085 **
( 0.062 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.106 ) ( 0.039 )
Financial literacy_1_medium -0.078 -0.054 0.132 -0.091 **
( 0.068 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.040 )
Financial literacy_1_high -0.120 -0.084 0.204 -0.072 *
( 0.090 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.152 ) ( 0.043 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.070 *** -0.049 *** 0.119 *** -0.065 *** -0.046 *** 0.111 *** 0.083 *** 0.080 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 510 510 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.19
Control mechanism (Advice only)
Monitoring Second opinion
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 7c. Control mechanism: Monitoring and Second opinion, by low, medium and high
nancial literacy (Advice only). Robustness: Financial Literacy_2
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in Table 7. The variable Financial Literacy
is replaced by Financial Literacy_2 (see Appendix A for details on the construction of the variable). Dependent
variable and regression techniques are the same as Table 7. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Rarely Sometimes Frequently Rarely Sometimes Frequently
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4)
Trust in advisor -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.028 0.020 -0.048 0.005 -0.001
( 0.106 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.180 ) ( 0.106 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.179 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.048 )
Financial Literacy_2_low 0.056 0.039 -0.096 0.085 **
( 0.044 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.039 )
Financial literacy_2_medium -0.122 ** -0.084 ** 0.206 ** -0.091 **
( 0.052 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.040 )
Financial literacy_2_high -0.219 *** -0.152 *** 0.371 *** -0.072 *
( 0.082 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.132 ) ( 0.043 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.068 *** -0.047 *** 0.115 *** -0.051 *** -0.035 *** 0.086 *** 0.083 *** 0.080 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes yes yes
Macroarea yes yes yes yes
#obs 510 510 510 510
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.18
Control mechanism (Advice only)
Monitoring Second opinion
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and




Figure 1. Financial literacy distribution
This gure represents the distribution of the variable Financial Literacy which captures the number of correct
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Figure 1a. Financial literacy distribution (robustness: "Financial Literacy_1")
This gure represents the distribution of the variable Financial Literacy_1 which captures the number of correct
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Figure 1b. Financial literacy distribution (robustness: "Financial Literacy_2")
This gure represents the distribution of the variable Financial Literacy_2 which captures the number of correct













Figure 2. Financial literacy cumulative distribution
This gure represents the cumulative distribution function of the variable Financial Literacy which captures the
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Figure 2a. Financial literacy cumulative distribution (robustness: "Financial Literacy_1")
This gure represents the cumulative distribution function of the variable Financial Literacy_1 which captures
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Figure 2b. Financial literacy cumulative distribution (robustness: "Financial Literacy_2")
This gure represents the cumulative distribution function of the variable Financial Literacy_2 which captures
























Unicredit Investors Survey: description of the main variables
The 2007 Unicredit Investors Survey (UCS),which draws from the population of clients of one of the three
largest European banking groups, with over 4 million accounts in Italy. The 2007 wave interviewed 1,676
individuals with a current account in one of the banks that are part of the Unicredit Group based in Italy.
The sample is representative of the eligible population of customers, excluding younger than 20 or older
than 75, and those who hold accounts of less than 10,000 euro or more than 2.5 million euro.
The sample selection is based on individual clients of Unicredit, however the survey contains detailed
information also on the head of household dened as the person responsible for the nancial matters of
the family and spouse, if present. As for the nancial variables, they are elicited both at the respondent
and household level.30
We restrict the sample to those investors for whom Unicredit is the main or only bank (1581 out of 1686)
Below we provide details for all relevant variables in the empirical analysis and report the survey variable
label in brackets.
Dependent variables
Holding risky assets (label: INVEST)
This binary variable is based on the answer to the following question:
"Do you currently own, or have owned in the past, nancial products other than current account (e.g.,
stocks, government bonds, mutual funds, etc.)?" The possible answers are YES/ YES, in the past/NO.
This variable takes value 1 if the answer is YES, 0 otherwise.
Self-Advice-Delegation (label: MODINV)
This variable separates, within the consulting activity, the role of advice and that of delegation. The measure
adopted is based on the question "In managing your nancial investment, which of these statements better
describes your attitude? A: I prefer to decide autonomously: the bank just executes my dispositions; B: I
discuss with my bank/advisor my intentions and ask an advice before taking a decision; C: I evaluate my
banks/advisors proposals before taking a decision; D: I mainly rely on my bank/advisor for my investment
decisions; E: I allow my bank (advisor) decide everything".
We construct a variable: "Self" if the answer is A, "Advice" if the answers are B-C and "Delegation" if
the answers are D-E.
Advice/Delegation (label: ADVICE)
This binary variable is based on the answer (YES/NO) to following question: "Considering all banks/nancial
institutions you and your family have relationship with, do you rely on the advice of a nancial consultant
to make your investment choices?"
30Notice that the Unicredit sample is older, more educated, more likely to live in the North and with higher family income
than the SHIW sample.
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Monitoring (label: ADVFREQ)
This measure is based on the following question: "How often do you meet your nancial advisor?"
The ten possible answers range from "never" (=10) to "every day" (=1). More precisely, the full scale
is the following: "every day" (=1); "at least once a week" (=2); "approximately every two weeks" (=3);
"approximately every month" (=4); "approximately once every 3 months" (=5); "approximately once every
6 months" (=6); "approximately once per year" (=7); "less frequently than once per year" (=8); "whenever
I feel like" (=9); "never" (=10).
We re-coded this variable in a three-category ordered variable equal to 0 ("Rarely") if the answers range
from 8 to 10, 1 ("Sometimes") if answers range from 5 to 7, and 2 ("Frequently") if the answers range from
1 to 4.
Monitoring_1
It is a binary variable based on the variable monitoring dened above and the variable capturing "Low
Satisfaction of advice" (see below). This variable is equal to 1 if the investor meets frequently her/his
advisor (i.e., if the variable "Monitoring" dened above is equal to 2) and if the level of satisfaction of the
advice is low (i.e., if the variable "Low Satisfaction of advice" is equal to 1),and 0 otherwise.
Second opinion (label: MARCHE)
It is a binary variable based on the answer (YES/NO) to following question:
"Have you ever asked your advisor products sold by other banks or nancial intermediaries"
Second opinion_1: Seeking bank competition (label: MULTIBA_6)
It is a variable based on the question "You told me that you make use of multiple banks. On this card
you can read some of the reasons why one can make use of multiple banks. Can you indicate the reasons
why you rely on more than one bank? Multiple answers are allowed". The possible reasons listed are: 1.
"To separate my entrepreneurial activity from personal accounts"; 2. "For privacy reasons"; 3. "To avoid
my wealth is wholly managed by a unique bank/nancial intermediary"; 4. "It is comfortable to have one
bank branch close to home, one close to o¢ ce"; 5. "Each bank has a specic competence on the service
required"; 6. "To make banks compete and then get better conditions"; 7. "Other". The variable is built
on the binary (YES/NO) answer to option 6, as it reveals the respondents intention to compare di¤erent
nancial intermediaries.
Main regressors
Trust in advisor (label: ADVTRUST)
The respondent is asked to answer the following question: "Overall, how much do you trust your bank or
nancial advisor concerning your investments?". The possible answers are: 1 (= a lot), 2 (= quite), 3 (=
not so much), 4 (= little), 5 (= not at all).
Trust in advisor_1
It is the binary version of the variable Trust in advisor. It is equal to 1 if Trust in advisor is larger than
(or equal to) the median (3) and 0 otherwise
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Financial Literacy
The respondent is awarded one point for answering correctly questions 1 to 8. The variable therefore ranges
from 0 to 8.
1. Ination (label: INFLATION)
Suppose a bank account yields a 2% interest per annum (after expenses and taxes). If actual ination
is 2% per year (assuming you did not access your account) after two years, the amount deposited can buy
you (select one answer):
a) More than it can buy today; b) less than it can buy today; c) the same as it can buy today (correct);
and d) cannot answer/cannot understand.
2. Interest rates (label: INTEREST)
Imagine having a tipand knowing for certain that in six months interest rates will rise. Do you think
it is appropriate to purchase xed rate bonds today?
a) Yes; b) no (correct); c) I do not know.
3. Diversication 1 (label: DIVERSIF1)
In relation to investments, people often talk about diversication. In your opinion, to have proper
diversication of ones investments means (select one response):
a) To have in ones investment portfolio bonds and shares; b) not to invest for too long in the same nan-
cial product; c) to invest in the greatest possible number of nancial products; d) to invest simultaneously
in multiple nancial products to limit exposure to the risks associated with individual products (correct);
e) to not invest in high-risk instruments; f) I do not know/cannot understand.
4. Diversication 2 (label: DIVERSIF2)
Which of these portfolios is better diversied?
a) 70% T-bills, 15% European equity fund, 15% in 2-3 Italian stocks ; b) 70% T-bills, 30% European
equity fund; c) 70% T-bills, 30% in 2-3 Italian stocks; d) 70% T-bills, 30% in stocks of companies I know
well; e) Do not know
Four other nancial literacy indicators are based on the question: How risky do you think these products
are?
The answers range from 1=Not risky at all, to 5=Very risky, and Do not knowis always an option.
One point is given if the respondent can correctly state that:
5. Private bonds are at least as risky as deposits (label: RISK1)
6. Stocks are at least as risky as government bonds (label: RISK2)
7. Stocks mutual funds are at least as risky as mutual funds (label: RISK3)
8. Housing is at least as risky as deposits (label: RISK4)
"Financial Literacy_low" is a binary version of the variable capturing a low level of nancial knowledge.
It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy variable is smaller than (or equal to) 3, and 0 otherwise.
"Financial Literacy_medium" is a binary version of the variable capturing a medium level of nancial
knowledge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy variable is equal to 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise.
"Financial Literacy_high" is a binary version of the variable capturing a high level of nancial knowledge.
It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy variable is larger than (or equal to) 6, and 0 otherwise.
Financial Literacy_1
The variable Financial Literacy_1 is similar to Financial Literacy with the exception of the exclusion of
question 2, being the one with the highest score of correct answers in the block of the rst four questions.31
31 In the second block, which is a composite test on the knowledge of risk, all four nancial literacy indicators display a larger
response rate than question 2 but we chose not to modify the second block. Indeed, by eliminating one of them the overall test
on the knowledge of riskiness would be undermined while by eliminating all of them the variability of the variable would have
shrunk from 0-8 to 0-4, thus making meaningless the split of the population in percentiles.
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The variable therefore ranges from 0 to 7.
"Financial Literacy_1_low" is a binary version of the variable capturing a low level of nancial knowl-
edge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy_1 variable is smaller than (or equal to) 2, and 0 otherwise.
"Financial Literacy_1_medium" is a binary version of the variable capturing a medium level of nancial
knowledge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial_1 Literacy variable is equal to 3, 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise.
"Financial Literacy_1_high" is a binary version of the variable capturing a high level of nancial
knowledge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy_1 variable is larger than (or equal to) 6, and 0
otherwise.
Financial Literacy_2
The variable Financial Literacy_2 is similar to Financial Literacy with the exception of the exclusion of
question 4, being the one with the lowest score of correct answers. The variable therefore ranges from 0 to
7.
"Financial Literacy_2_low" is a binary version of the variable capturing a low level of nancial knowl-
edge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy_2 variable is smaller than (or equal to) 3, and 0 otherwise.
"Financial Literacy_2_medium" is a binary version of the variable capturing a medium level of nancial
knowledge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial_2 Literacy variable is equal to 4, and 0 otherwise.
"Financial Literacy_2_high" is a binary version of the variable capturing a high level of nancial
knowledge. It is equal to 1 if the Financial Literacy_2 variable is larger than (or equal to) 5, and 0
otherwise.
Self-assessed nancial knowledge (label: ABILITY)
The respondent is asked: "Which is the degree of knowledge relative to ten assets (government bonds,
repurchase agreements, private bonds, mutual funds, derivatives, unit-linked or index-linked life insurance,
ETFs, managed portfolios, and structured products)?". The answers range from 1 (=not at all) to 5 (=very
well). The index used in the analysis (1-5) is the average of these ten measures.
Risk aversion (label: PROPRISK)
The variable is based on the question "In managing your nancial investment which of these attitudes do
you usually have? When I invest I usually look for Very high returns, even with a high risk of losing part of
my principal (LOW); High returns with a fair degree of principal safety and Fair returns with high safety
for my principal (MEDIUM); Low returns without risk of losing my principal (HIGH)". We re-code this
variable in three levels of risk aversion (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW).
Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate (label: MOTVBA)
This binary variable captures the expected payo¤ of seeking advice and should determine the choice of
asking advice/delegation versus self-directing own investment.
To build our measure of expected payo¤ of advice/delegate we refer to Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003).
The expected payo¤ of advice or delegate in equilibrium is32: xV   p  s = V   p  2s=x. V represents the
value of the optimal recommended product, p is the price, s is the direct cost of control and x is the level
32Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), equation (6), page 424. Note that the full search cost would be (d + s), where d is the
direct cost of advice, but it can be discarded because Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) show that it equals 0 in equilibrium (see
Proposition 1 on pag. 426)
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of e¤ort of the advisor. 2s=x represents the expected cost of control: the higher are the direct control costs
(i.e., the search costs or opportunity costs of time) and/or the lower is the e¤ort of the advisor, the higher
are the expected control costs. The expression on the left-hand side is the value for investors who stop and
buy the recommended product, while the expression on the right-hand side is the value for investors who
search for a second opinion: the two values equate in equilibrium.
To construct a proxy of this measure of "expected payo¤ of advice/delegate" we rely on the following
composite question:
"If you had to choose a bank for your investments, how important would be the following factors
in your nal choice?" A. proximity to home/o¢ ce; B: ample choice of products and services; C. good
performance of products; D. good relationship with bank employees; E. consultantscompetence; F. prices
competitiveness; G. innovative products and services; H. quality and completeness of communications and
information (current account reporting, etc.); I. telephone and internet services.
The ve possible answers range from "Not at all" (1) to "Very important" (5).
We proxy V with the factor B (the utility attached to the optimal investor-specic product is larger
if the choice of products is wider), p with factor F and the expected control costs with a combination of
factors A and I (proxying the opportunity cost of time), and of factors C and E (proxying the e¤ort of the
advisor).
The measure adopted in the main specication is a binary variable identifying a high expected payo¤ of
advice/delegate.
It is equal to 1 if
8>>>>><>>>>>:
B >= 4| {z }
V high
; F >= 4| {z }
p low
; A <= 3 & I <= 3| {z }
low search cost
or C >= 4 & E >= 4| {z }
high e¤ort| {z }
low expected control cost
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
; 0 otherwise.
Expected payo¤ of seeking advice_1
This measure is a variant of the measure Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate computed above, to test the
sensitivity of the ndings to a variation in the choice of cut-o¤ answers.
It is equal to 1 if
8>>>>><>>>>>:
B > 4| {z }
V high
; F > 4| {z }
p low
; A < 3 & I < 3| {z }
low search cost
or C > 4 & E > 4| {z }
high e¤ort| {z }
low expected control cost
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
; 0 otherwise.
Expected payo¤ of seeking advice_2
This measure is a variant of the measure Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate computed above, to test the
sensitivity of the ndings to a variation in the denition of search costs. In particular, we consider only the
factor I (telephone and internet services) as proxying the opportunity cost of time of the investor.
It is equal to
8>>>>><>>>>>:
B >= 4| {z }
V high
; F >= 4| {z }
p low
; I <= 3| {z }
low search cost
or C >= 4 & E >= 4| {z }
high e¤ort| {z }





Average regional nancial literacy (from SHIW)
This variable is average nancial literacy at the regional level taken from the Bank of Italys Survey on
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
School performance (label: SCHOOL)
The variable is based on the question "Where were you placed as a pupil when you attended junior high
school?
1: in the group of best students; 2: above the median; 3: about at median; 4: below the median".
Our variable is constructed as a binary variable taking value 1 if the client belongs to the group 1 and
0 otherwise.
General trust_1 (label: TRUST)
TRUST: binary variable based on the answer to the following question: "Generally speaking, do you think
that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?. A value 1 is
associated to the answer "I think that most people can be trusted" and a value 0 to the answer "You cannot
be too careful in dealing with people".
General trust_2 (label: TRUST2)
TRUST2: variable based on the answer to the following question: "How important is for you to build trust
relationships with people in everyday life?" and the answer can range from 1 (=not at all important) to 5
(=very important)
Other relevant variables
Satisfaction of Unicredit banks nancial advice (label: UCISODD)
This variable relies on the answer to the question: "Overall, which is your level of satisfaction for the way
Unicredit manages your nancial investments?" and the answer ranges from 5 (=not satised at all) to 5
(=very satised). We re-code the variable to attach a higher score (5) to the higher level of satisfaction.
Low Satisfaction of advice
This is a binary version of the above-dened variable,equal to 1 for low level of satisfaction (1 to 3), and 0
otherwise.
Frequency of trading (label: FREQMOV)
This variable relies on the question "How often do you revise your investment position, buying or sell-
ing assets?" and the answer ranges from 1 (=every day) to 11 (=never). We re-coded this variable in a
three-category ordered variable -to match the recoding of the monitoring variable ADVFREQ- equal to
0 ("Rarely") if the answers range from 8 to 11, 1 ("Sometimes") if answers range from 5 to 7, and 2
("Frequently") if the answers range from 1 to 4.
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Wealth (label: FPATRIM)
The wealth refers to the respondents holdings at Unicredit (2006, 30th June) and is dened in brackets (1:
10k-50k; 2: 50k-100k; 3: 100k-150k; 4: 150k-250k; 5: 250k-500k; 6: 500k-5000k). Note that the sample
includes clients with a nancial wealth in Unicredit at least equal to 10 thousands euros.
Income (label: YLIND)
This variable comprises labour income perceived by the respondent at the end of year 2006.
Experience (label: ETA)
This variables captures the experience of investors in dealing with nancial instruments. It is equal to
the maximum experience (measured in years) attached to the three types of instruments considered, i.e.,
government bonds, mutual funds and stocks.
Finance Sector (label: APSETT_IN)




Table 13a: Demand of advice, trust and Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate_1
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 6. The exclusion restriction
Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate adopted in columns (1)-(2) of Table 6, is replaced here by Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate_1
(see Appendix A for details on the construction of the variable). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegation
(1) (2)
Trust in advisor 0.315 *** 0.144 ***
( 0.065 ) ( 0.019 )
Financial Literacy 0.222 *** -0.017
( 0.056 ) ( 0.015 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.051 * 0.039
( 0.026 ) ( 0.032 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate_1 0.020 0.062 *
( 0.031 ) ( 0.032 )
Risk aversion -0.062 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes
Macroarea yes yes
#obs 1550 1098
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.12
Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.32
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.86
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 11.06
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.58
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.75
-
Selection
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 13b. Demand of advice, trust and Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate_2
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 6. The exclusion restriction
Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate adopted in columns (1)-(2) of Table 6, is replaced here by Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate_2
(see Appendix A for details on the construction of the variable). Dependent variable and regression techniques are the same
as columns (1)-(2) of Table 5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegation
(1) (2)
Trust in advisor 0.323 *** 0.149 ***
( 0.064 ) ( 0.016 )
Financial Literacy 0.223 *** -0.019
( 0.057 ) ( 0.013 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.049 * 0.040 *
( 0.026 ) ( 0.021 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate_2 -0.032 0.063 *
( 0.025 ) ( 0.034 )
Risk aversion -0.060 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes
Macroarea yes yes
#obs 1550 1098
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.12
Instrumented endogenous regressors : Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.38
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.74
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 11.26
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.68
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.71
-
Selection
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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Table 13c. Demand of advice, Trust in advisor_1 and Expected payo¤ of advice/delegate
This table reports robustness checks of the main ndings reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 6. The variable Trust in
advisor is replaced here by its binary version, Trust in advisor_1. Dependent variable and regression techniques are the same
as Table 5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hold risky assets Advice/Delegation
(1) (2)
Trust in advisor_1 0.833 *** 0.283 ***
( 0.166 ) ( 0.034 )
Financial Literacy 0.213 *** -0.021 *
( 0.057 ) ( 0.013 )
Self-assessed financial knowledge -0.045 * 0.037 *
( 0.026 ) ( 0.021 )
Expected payoff of advice/delegate -0.056 ** 0.068 **
( 0.026 ) ( 0.033 )
Risk aversion -0.059 ***
( 0.015 ) *** *** ***
Demographics yes yes
Income and wealth yes yes
Macroarea yes yes
#obs 1550 1098
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.12
Instrumented endogenous regressors: Financial l iteracy
Trust in advisor
      Wu-Hausman test (χ2(2)  p-value) 0.00 0.65
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test :
              Financial l iteracy 7.75
                  p-value 0.00
              Trust in advisor 7.70
                  p-value 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic : 0.33
                χ2 (2)  p-value 0.85
None
Selection
Notes: Demographics includes age, age squared , dummy for nance sector, dummy for gender, dummy for self-employm ent, dummy for retirem ent status,
number of years of exp erience w ith nancia l instrum ents, number of years at Unicred it Bank. Income and wealth includes the (log of ) ind iv idual incom e and
the nancia l wealth brackets. Macroarea considers the North-West, the North-East, the Center and the South-Islands geographical areas.
Source: UCS (2007).
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